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1 Introduction
During the last fty years, the number of nations has increased dramatically from 74 in
1946 to 193 in 1997. Many of these countries were born out of the decolonization process
in Africa and in the rest of the world. Moreover, in this era more than twenty boundaries
between nations were changed, without creating or eliminating a nation.
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More recently,
referenda have been held in many countries and these have resulted in substantial changes
in political structure (as in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales in Great Britain and
East Timor in Indonesia). At the same time, we are witnessing a move towards greater
integration in Europe, which is accompanied by lowering of boundaries between countries.
In this paper, we study the role of the size of regions in determining the incentives for
separation and unication. The main questions we address are as follows:
 Do smaller regions have the same incentives for union as compared to larger regions
and are incentives for union and separation reecting socially desirable outcomes?
 How do political rules inuence the incentives for union and separation under ma-
jority voting?
When the regions dier much in size it is possible that in a union the large region
dominates or colonizes the small region. We will examine if such unequal or unconditional
union can be in the interests of the dierent regions. This is related to the question if one
should expect union of unequal size regions or equal size regions.
To determine the inuence of size on the incentives for separation we set up the following
simple model. There are two regions, with one region being larger than the other.
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We
assume that the regions have the same density of population. Thus size can be interpreted
in terms of population or in terms of area. These regions can choose to be independent
countries or to unite, by majority voting. In each region, a referendum is held on union and
separation. If a majority in both regions prefers union then the outcome is union, and so
there is one country. If both regions vote for separation then there will be two countries. So
in case of disagreement, the two regions separate, i.e. the status quo outcome is separation.
1
See The Times Atlas [1993, Plate 8] for a survey map on border changes and changes in sovereignty
since 1945.
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The notion of regions we use is quite general. We believe that similar considerations would also apply
to other political jurisdictions. To keep the text as readable as possible we will use the terms nations and
countries throughout.
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After the decision on unication and separation the individuals in the region choose the
type/location of government they want to have. This determines, for example, where the
capital, the national airport, the universities and other facilities are located. The model
is than interpreted in a geographic dimension. The individuals living close to the capital
then have the highest payo. Seccesionist activitities will therefore take place at the fringe
of the nation: the individuals at the fringe of a nation will live closer to the capital if the
nation breaks up.
The model also has an interpretation in a preference dimension. Individuals who are
close to each other are assumed to have the same preferred type of government. Govern-
ments located far from individuals dier more from the preferred type of government of
these individuals than from the preferred type of government of the individuals who are
located in close proximity of the government. The choice of the type of government, for
example, can determine which social security system will prevail. The people who live
close to the capital or equivalently, who prefer the prevailing social security system, have
a higher payo than other individuals.
In the basic model the costs of having a government are supposed to be xed: they do
not depend on the size of a nation and factors like economic development and economic
integration. The xed cost assumption leads up to the following basic trade-o. When
a region is smaller, the people in this region are more likely to have their preferred type
of government. Since the costs of government are xed, independent of the size of the
country, the tax rates will be higher in a smaller nation than in a larger nation. When the
people choose for union with the other region, they will also pay less taxes but it is also
less likely that they have their preferred type of government.
In our model, the increase in the payo of an individual of being closer to the public
good is linear. The tax advantage for the smaller region from union is, however, strictly
decreasing and convex in its own size. For very small regions, the tax advantage is clearly
enormous and dominates the loss in political inuence. The large region faces the reverse
trade-os: the tax advantages of union are increasing in the size of the smaller region.
Moreover, they are also convex in the size of the smaller region. This implies that when
the smaller region is very small then it is likely that the tax advantages are oset by the
political costs. Thus the large region prefers a union with relatively large other regions
only. These observations have the following implication: very small regions will have major
incentives to merge, but the marginal tax gain for the large region is relatively minor and
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no union will take place, if the regions are very unequal in size. Thus, union will only occur
between regions which have approximately the same size.
We show that the incentives for union and separation under majority voting do not
reect social welfare accurately. This means that under majority voting the aggregate
welfare is not maximized. Individuals in the large region who are located far from the small
region have an incentive to separate to get the public goods closer to their preferences. The
individuals who are located close to the other region have an incentive for union, but in
case of separation they should also pay more taxes. The costs of separation are thus not
borne exclusively by the individuals who are in favour of separation. Hence there exists
excessive incentives for separation: under majority voting there will be more countries than
socially desirable. This leads us to study alternative political institutions that may help
mitigate the ineÆciency.
We next examine the role of status quo in determining the nature of voting equilibrium.
It is possible that the regions which are voting on union and separation initially form a
union. It is then appropriate to have separation solely when both regions prefer separation.
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When we apply this condition, there are still, although less, excessive incentives for sepa-
ration. The decision on union and separation can also be taken in one referendum in which
individuals of both regions participate, i.e. in a nationwide referendum. We nd that the
outcome under a nationwide referendum is the same as in the case where separation only
takes place when both regions agree on separation. This analysis suggests that the nding
that majority voting leads to too much separation is robust.
Finally, we examine the prospects of unequal union. If there are only a few individuals
in the small region then the tax burden will be very high. One way out would be for the
small region to accept unequal or unconditional union. In this case only the large region
determines the location or type of the public good. This implies that unequal union takes
place when regions dier very much in size. This gives a simple explanation for why small
islands Montserrat in the Caribean and Bermuda in the Pacic might prefer to remain
crown colonies of the United Kingdom.
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Our paper is a contribution to the study of country formation and secession. There has
been renewed interest in such issues in recent years, see e.g. Alesina and Spolaore [1997],
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We may interpret a national parliament deciding on break up of a nation as analogous to a nationwide
referendum on union and separation.
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Other examples are: small countries such as Luxembourg willing to be essentially passive members of
the NATO, Liechtenstein participating in a customs union with Switzerland using the Swiss franc as its
national currency and Puerto Rico where indigenous inhabitants are US citizens but do not vote in US
presidential elections.
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Bolton and Roland [1997], Casella and Feinstein [1990] and Wei [1991a, 1991b]
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In par-
ticular, our paper is closely related to the paper by Alesina and Spolaore [1997] and Wei
[1991a, 1991b].
Alesina and Spolaore [1997] study the equilibrium determination of the number (and
size) of countries in dierent political regimes, in dierent economic environments and
under varying levels of economic integration. They use the same trade-o as we use. The
economic advantages of unication are compared with the political costs of a xed-costs
public good which is less close to the preferences of local majorities. In this setting, they
nd that democratization leads to an ineÆciently large number of countries. In their
analysis, the boundaries between nations are endogenous but they restrict attention to
outcomes with equal sized countries. In our paper, the focus is on the role of relative size
of the dierent regions. The sizes of the regions are exogenously specied; we take them
to be dened via non-economic factors such as cultural, geographic or ethnical dierences
across regions. This focus on relative region size also allows us to examine the scope of
political arrangements such as unequal union.
Wei [1991] examines a model in which the size of the regions is exogenously specied.
Moreover, he allows for the level of a public good in a nation to vary depending on the level
of economic development and the size of the nation. The trade-o in his model is between
the higher eÆciency of the public good under union and the lower coordination costs under
separation. Wei argued that the stage of development or degree of specialization of a region
inuences the decision on union and separation. The main result involving regional size is
that a small region is more eager to secede from a unied nation than a large region, when
secession is very costly and the economy is at low levels of development. However, as the
economy develops, the small region is the rst to demand national unication. Wei also
argued that when separation and unication processes are costly, these processes do not
always take place when the situation after the process is preferred by a majority in each
region. Wei does not look at socially desirable incomes. Our analysis diers from Wei's in
that we consider a xed-costs public good and that we use a very dierent trade-o: we
compare the eÆciency gains in terms of one as against two governments with the political
5
These recent political economy papers on nations is related to the local public good literature and of the
literature on scal federalism. For the local public good theory, see Austin [1993], Benabou [1993,1995], Be-
wley [1981], Epple, Filimon and Romer [1984], Epple and Romer [1991], Fernandez and Rogerson [1994], Je-
hiel and Scotchmer [1995], Rubinfeld [1987], Scotchmer [1996], Stahl and Varaiya [1983] and Tiebout [1956].
For literature on scal ferderalism see Alesina and Spolaore [1995], Alesina, Perotti and Spolaore [1995],
Musgrave [1959], Oates [1972], Persson and Tabellini [1992,1993,1994] and Wildasin [1988].
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costs of greater distance to the government. In addition, we study the nature of socially
desirable outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic model. Section 3
contains the analysis of this model, the solution to the majority voting process and the
socially optimal outcome as well as a comparison of the two outcomes. In Section 4 we
discuss the role of alternative political systems, while Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic Model
We suppose that one public good which identies a nation (i.e. a country); we call this
public good the 'government'. The range of all possible governments is normalized in the
segment [0; 1]. The location of a government is denoted by l. In addition, we assume that
the total population has mass one and that individuals from this population are located
at ideal points, which indicates their preferred government. The individuals are uniformly
distributed on the segment [0; 1]. The utility of each individual is decreasing with the
distance from his government to his location (i.e. his ideal point). The distance between
the ideal point of a consumer i and the government in his country is denoted by d
i
.
We assume that there will be either one or two countries (i.e. governments), which
have a xed (exogenous) boundary . The region located at the left-hand side of  is
called region A, and the region at the right-hand side of  is called region B. Without loss
of generality, we suppose that 0 <  < 1=2. We assume that there is a xed cost F per
country, regardless of its size
6
. This F includes for example the costs of building airports
and hospitals and the costs of having a machinery of government. In the basic model every
individual has the same, exogenous income y, and pays the lump-sum tax t
i
.
7
Now, we
can dene the utility function for each individual i:
U(i) = g(1  ad
i
) + y   t
i
(1)
where g and a are two positive parameters. The parameter g measures the utility of the
public good when the preference distance d
i
is zero and the parameter a measures the loss
in utility if the government is farther away (i.e. when d
i
increases). The utility function is
6
When the costs of a government depends on the size of the country, we could model the costs as
F = f + s where s denotes the size of the country. We conjecture that, as long as f is positive, our main
results will carry over.
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Here we assume that individual wealth is equal in the two regions. We examine the case of unequal
wealth across regions in Appendix B.
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thus linear in the preference distance. For simplicity we assume that a < 1. The parameter
a can then be interpreted as the marginal utility of a government located at a distance d
i
.
We look at the socially optimal incentives for separation and unication and at the
incentives for separation and unication under majority voting. In the latter case we
assume that separation occurs when a majority of voters is in favour of separation in at
least one region. This voting rule is realistic when the central government is too weak
or does not want to prevent secession through military means. The disintegration of
the former Soviet Union, for example, took place after the central government could not
prevent secessions.
8
The majority voting rule is also relevant when two initial independent
countries are considering political integration which takes place only if it is favoured by a
majority in each initial country.
3 Analysis of the basic model.
In this section we will rst examine the outcomes when decision to form one or two countries
is taken by majority voting and then we will derive the socially optimal number of countries.
3.1 Majority voting.
In this part we will examine the case when the decision to form one or two countries
is taken by majority voting. Intuitively, it is clear that if  becomes very small then the
small region (region A) will prefer union. The per capita cost of supporting an independent
government, F=, becomes very large and the individuals in region A will therefore benet
a lot from unication. The individuals in region B will also compare the benet of a
lower tax rate under unication with the disadvantage of a change in the location of the
public good under unication. This comparison depends in turn on the linearity of political
costs, and the convexity of the tax advantage arising out of union. We will discuss this
comparison after the proof of Proposition 1.
Our analysis of these issues is summarized in Proposition 1. We dene 
A
= 2F=ga
and 
B
= 1  2F=ga.
Proposition 1 There exists numbers 
A
and 
B
such that region A prefers union if and
only if  < 
A
while region B prefers union if and only if  > 
B
. Thus union only takes
place if 
B
< 
A
and  2 [
B
; 
A
].
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The recent referendum in East Timor is another example of this procedure.
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The rst step in the proof is to show that the preferences of the person in the center
of a region reect the majority opinions in each region perfectly. This is the content of
Lemma 1. The reasoning behind this lemma is that when the individual in the centre of
a region prefers something and when utility is linearly decreasing with respect to location
by the same rate under all alternatives then a majority in the region shares the preference
of the individual in the centre of that region. The majority is formed by the individuals
which are located either to the left or to the right of the individual in the centre.
Lemma 1 In region A (region B) there is a majority in favour of separation if the indi-
vidual in the centre of that region wants separation.
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in the Appendix A. We now present the proof of
Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: There will be a majority in favour of union in region A if the
consumer =2 prefers union:
U
II
(

2
) = g + y  
F

< g(1  a j
1
2
 

2
j) + y   F = U
I
(

2
) (2)
That is, if
 <
2F
ga
= 
A
(3)
There is a majority in favour of union in region B if the consumer (1+)=2 prefers union:
U
II
(
1 + 
2
) = g + y  
F
1  
< g(1  a

2
) + y   F = U
I
(
1 + 
2
) (4)
That is, if
 > 1 
2F
ga
= 1  
A
= 
B
(5)
This completes the proof.
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We now return to the discussion on the eects of a lower tax rate and the disadvantage of
a larger preference distance under unication. These two eects do not inuence utility in
the same way. The inuence of the preference distance is linear in  but the inuence of
a lower tax rate is not linear in . This is shown in Figures 1a-1c.
| Insert Figures 1a-1c somewhere here |
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Figure 1a shows the trade-o for low values of F , Figure 1b the trade-o for intermediate
values of F , and Figure 1c the trade-o for high values of F . The expressions for the
tax benets and the distance costs for the individuals in region B can be derived from
inequality (4). They are F=(1  ) and ga=2, respectively.
It is straightforward to derive from inequality (2) that for region A the tax benet of
a change from separation to union is F=  F while the distance costs are ga=2  ga=2.
For low values of , we see in Figure 1a, 1c and 1e a large tax eect in region A. Region A
therefore prefers union for low values of .
For region B we see in Figures 1a and 1b that for low values of  the positive tax
benets under unication is not outweighed by the costs of longer preference distances
under unication. Region B therefore prefers union for higher values of  and separation
for lower values of . From Figure 1c it becomes clear that for high values of F Region B
prefers union for all values of : separation is then too expensive.
We summarize the outcomes under majority voting as follows.
Proposition 2 The outcomes under majority voting are given as follows: (a) F < ga=4
then there will be no union for all  2 [0; 1=2] under majority voting, (b) if ga=4 < F <
ga=2 then there will be union for all  2 [
B
; 1=2] under majority voting and (c) if ga=2 < F
then there will be union for all  2 [0; 1=2] under majority voting.
The interesting case is when ga=4 < F < ga=2 since in that case union occurs for  2
[1   2F=ga; 1=2]. Note that the expression 1  2F=ga is decreasing with respect to F . A
rise in the costs of a government will therefore make union more likely. If the maximum
payo of a government g increases then 1   2F=ga will also increase and union becomes
less likely. This also holds for an increase in the preference intensity a.
3.2 The social optimum.
In this section we characterize the socially optimal level of union and separation. It is
socially optimal to have two independent nations when the increase of the total payo
outweighs the additional costs. The total payo increases because the individuals will more
likely have their preferred type of the public good. The additional costs are the xed costs
of the extra government. Therefore it is only socially optimal to have two independent
nations when the xed costs of the public good are low. When the smaller region is
very small, the total additional payo of the individuals in that region of having their
9
own government does not outweigh the additional costs of having an extra government.
Therefore it is also only socially optimal to have two independent nations when the nations
do not dier too much in size.
This analysis is summarized in the next proposition. We dene F
SP
= ga=8 and

SP
= 1=2 
q
1=4  2F=ga.
Proposition 3 If F > F
SP
then union is the unique optimal outcome; if F < F
SP
then
union is optimal if and only if  < 
SP
; separation is optimal otherwise.
The details of the calculations are given in Appendix A.
3.3 Majority Voting and Social Optima Compared.
A comparison of the outcomes under majority voting and the social optima reveals:
Proposition 4 (i) if F > ga=2 then union is socially optimal as well as the majority
voting outcome for all  2 [0; 1=2], (ii) if ga=4 < F < ga=2 then union is socially optimal
for all  2 [0; 1=2] but separation obtains under majority voting for all  2 [1 2F=ga; 1=2],
(iii) if ga=8 < F < ga=4 then union is socially optimal for all  2 [0; 1=2] but separation
obtains under majority voting for all  2 [0; 1=2] and (iv) if F < ga=8 then union is socially
optimal for all  2 [0; 1=2 
q
1=4  2F=ga] but separation obtains under majority voting
for all  2 [0; 1=2].
These results are illustrated in Figures 2a-2d
9
.
| Insert Figures 2a-2d here |
The eects of changes in F , g and a on the the socially optimal incentives for union
are the same as on the incentives under majority voting. An increase in F or a decrease
in a or g will lead to an increase of the socially optimal incentives for separation.
It follows from Proposition 4 that there exists excessive incentives for separation under
majority voting: for certain parameter values majority voting obtains separation but the
9
Note that F < ga=8 implies 2F=ga < 1=2  
p
1=4  2F=ga and 1   2F=ga > 1=2  
p
1=4  2F=ga
(and thus 2F=ga > 1  2F=ga), that F > ga=4 implies 1  2F=ga < 2Fga and that F > ga=2 implies that
2F=ga > 1 and 1  2F=ga < 0 (and thus 1  2F=ga < 2F=ga).
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socially optimal solution is union. The excessive incentives appear from the fact that the
costs of separation are borne equally, but the benets of separation borne unequally. The
costs of separation, F   F= for the small region and F   F=(1   ), are borne equally
by the individuals in each region because of the lump sum taxation system. The benets
of separation of an individual depend on the location of the individuals. The individuals
located close to the boundary between the regions will loose the most from separation,
and the individuals at the other sides of both regions gain the most from separation. The
aggregate increase in the payo of these individuals, however, is less than the aggregate
decrease in the payo of the individuals located close to the boundary between the two
regions.
4 Alternative Political Institutions
The previous analysis gives insight into the incentives for separation and union under
majority voting. A comparison with socially optimally outcomes reveals that there exists
excessive incentives for separation under majority voting. This motivates an examination
of alternative political institutions which may help to mitigate such ineÆciencies.
We start with considering the role of the status quo, which species what happens
when the majority voting outcomes of both regions are dierent. After that we will look
at what happens when just one nationwide referendum is organized to decide on union
and separation. Finally, we examine the prospects for unequal union: this is an outcome
in which one region gives up the inuence on the location of the government, and thus on
the type of the public good.
4.1 Status quo.
In the basic model, we apply the following majority voting rule: in each region, a refer-
endum is organized over separation and union. When there exists a majority in favour of
union in both regions then union will take place. Otherwise, both regions keep separate.
As mentioned earlier, this voting rule is realistic when in an initially unied nation, the
central government is too weak or does not want prevent secession through military means.
This voting rule is also relevant when two initially independent nations are considering
political integration. It is obvious, however, that these conditions do not need to hold.
There may, for example, exist an authoritarian regime in an initially unied nation which
can stop secession supported by just one region but which can not stop secession supported
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by both regions. (When this authoritarian regime is strong enough to prevent secessions
always, then secession will never take place. This outcome is not very interesting and
will therefore be neglected in this text.) A regime in an initially unied nation may want
to prevent secession because, for example, secession means loss of prestige or lower tax
revenues. When such a regime exists, we can apply the following majority voting rule:
in each region a referendum is organized over separation and union. When there exists a
majority in favour of separation in both regions then separation will take place. Otherwise,
both regions keep unied.
The attempts of Hungary and Czechoslovakia to leave the former communist-bloc, for
example, was blockaded by the other nations in these bloc. Decades later, however, when
the idea of secession was supported by more nations in the communist-bloc, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia were allowed to leave the bloc.
The rule is also relevant when one region can prevent the other region from separation
or when the constitution leads to union when both regions do not agree. A region may want
to prevent secession because secession would mean unreasonably high tax rates. Aruba,
an island in the Caribean Sea, for example, is still a part of the Netherlands. The Dutch
constitution allows changes in the status of Aruba if the governments of Aruba and the
Netherlands both agree. Although there was at least a wish by Dutch politicians for an
independent Aruba, this was blocked by the island.
Under majority voting a status quo species what happens when the regions do not
agree. For the majority voting rule used in the basic model the status quo, or default
option, is separation. For the majority voting rule we will now use, the status quo will be
union.
We start by observing that socially optimal outcomes do not change with a change
in status quo rules: The socially optimal solution is independent of the status quo rule.
Hence, the socially optimal solution in the model with union as status quo is the same as
the socially optimal solution in the model with separation as status quo.
The intuition behind this is straightforward. In the social optimal solution the decision
on union and separation is taken by maximizing total utility and not by considering a
possible dierence in preference of majorities in each region. The socially optimal solution
will therefore not change.
We next observe that the necessary conditions for a majority in favour of union in a
region: The conditions on  for having a majority preferring union in a region are the
same as in Proposition 1. In fact a useful reformulation of Proposition 1 is: There exists
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an 
A
such that a majority in region A prefers separation if and only if  > 
A
and there
exists an 
B
such that region B prefers separation if and only of  < 
B
. In the proof of
Proposition 1 we determined the conditions on  for having a majority by comparing the
payos of the median voter under union and under separation. Using the new majority
voting rule neither the median voter nor his utilities are changed, so the conditions on 
will also be the same.
Since we have changed the status quo from separation into union, the existence of
a majority in favour of separation in both regions is crucial. Using the majority voting
rule with union as status quo and using Propositions 1-3, it is easy to derive Figures 3a-3d.
| Insert Figures 3a-3d here |
In the next Proposition, we give the exact conditions for the occurrence of union and
separation under majority voting and the socially optimally outcomes. Propositions 1-4,
in combination with the analysis from Section 3, allows us to state Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 (a) If F > ga=4 then union is socially optimal as well as the majority
voting outcome for all  2 [0; 1=2], (b) if ga=8 < F < ga=4 then union is socially optimal
for all  2 [0; 1=2] but separation obtains under majority voting for all  2 [2F=ga; 1=2]
and (c) if F < ga=8 then union is socially optimal for all  2 [0; 1=2 
q
1=4  2F=ga] but
separation obtains under majority voting for all  2 [2F=ga; 1=2].
When the status quo is changed from separation into union one might expect that
union becomes more likely. Indeed, union is now the majority voting outcome for more
parameter values. However, a comparison of the above result with the conditions derived
in our eÆciency result suggest that even under this stricter political institution, excessive
incentives for separation persist.
4.2 One nationwide referendum.
In the majority voting rules we studied until now, separate referenda were organized in each
region. However, it is also possible that just one referendum is organized in an (initially)
unied nation to decide on separation or union. If we interpret a national parliament
deciding on break up of a nation as analogous to a nationwide referendum on union and
13
separation then the vote on the break up of Czechoslovakia can be seen as an example of
this system
10
.
The majority voting rule is also relevant in many dierent situations. For example,
when the decision on separation or union is taken by a parliament with proportional rep-
resentation in the unied nation. This was the case in Belgium: the transformation from
a centralized state into a federation was only possible when this transformation was sup-
ported by a majority in the parliament.
If two separate referenda are held then it will be possible that the results of these
referenda are not the same. It is therefore necessary to specify a status quo, which denes
what happens in that case. When we organize just one referendum, there is no need to
specify a status quo, because both alternatives are now mutually exclusive.
In the following Proposition, we make clear under which condition separation is sup-
ported in one nationwide referendum.
Proposition 6 There exists a majority in favour of separation in the whole nation if and
only if there exists a majority in each region in favour of separation.
Proof: A majority in each region implies that we have a majority in the whole nation,
so the proof of the if-part of the statement is trivial. The proof of the only if-part of the
statement is more demanding. The only if-part of the statement is equivalent to: When
there does not exists a majority in favour of separation in at least one region then there
does not exists a majority in favour of separation in the whole nation. There are three
dierent cases in which there does not exist a majority in favour of separation in each
region:
Case A There exists neither a majority in favour of separation in region A nor in region B.
Case B There exists a majority in favour of separation in region A but not in region B.
Case C There exists a majority in favour of separation in region B but not in region A.
In case A it is trivial that there does not exist a majority in favour of separation in the
whole nation.
Before discussing the cases B and C, note that
U
II
(
1
2
) = g  
1
2
ga+ y  
F
1  
< g + y   F = U
I
(
1
2
) (6)
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Actually there were three votes on the separation agreement: one in the Czech, one in the Slovak
and one in the Czechoslovakian parliament. In all votings there was a majority in favour of separation.
Our result below, Proposition 6, may be interpreted as saying that either the vote in the Czechoslovakian
parliament or the two votes in the Czech and the Slovak parliaments were superuous.
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Using Lemma 1, we know that case B implies that:
U
II
(
1 + 
2
) < U
I
(
1 + 
2
) (7)
because there does not exists a majority in favour of union in region B. We also know that
@U
I
(i)
@i
=  ga 8i 2 [
1
2
; 1] (8)
This implies that U
I
(i) is decreasing in i 2 [1=2; (1 + )=2].
@U
II
(i)
@i
= ga 8i 2 [;
1 + 
2
] (9)
This implies that U
II
(i) is increasing in i 2 [1=2; (1 + )=2].
@U
II
(i)
@i
=  ga 8i 2 [
1 + 
2
; 1] (10)
This implies that U
II
(i) is decreasing in i 2 [(1 + )=2; 1].
From expressions (7), (8) and (9) it follows that U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for all i 2 [1=2; (1+)=2] and
from expressions (7), (8) and (10) it follows that U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for all i 2 [(1+)=2; 1], so
U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for all i 2 [1=2; 1]. Inequality (6) and the continuity of the utility function in
i imply that the individuals suÆciently close to the individual located at 1=2 prefer union.
Hence there does not exist a majority in favour of separation in case B.
Using Lemma 1, we know that case C implies that:
U
II
(

2
) < U
I
(

2
) (11)
because there exists a majority in favour of separation in region A. We also know that
@U
I
(i)
@i
= ga 8i 2 [0;
1
2
] (12)
This implies that U
I
(i) is increasing in i 2 [0; 1=2].
@U
II
(i)
@i
= ga 8i 2 [0;

2
] (13)
so U
II
(i) is increasing in i 2 [0; =2],
@U
II
(i)
@i
=  ga 8i 2 [

2
; ] (14)
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so U
II
(i) is decreasing in i 2 [=2; ] and
@U
II
(i)
@i
= ga 8i 2 [;
 + 1
2
] (15)
so U
II
(i) is increasing in i 2 [; 1=2].
From expressions (11), (12) and (13) it follows that U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for all i 2 [0; =2],
from expressions (11), (12) and (14) it follows that U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for all i 2 [=2; ] and
from expressions (6), (12) and (15) it follows that U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for all i 2 [; 1=2], so
U
II
(i) < U
I
(i) for all i 2 [0; 1=2]. Inequality (6) and the continuity of the utility function in
i imply that the individuals suÆciently close to the individual located at 1=2 prefer union.
Hence there does not exist a majority in favour of separation in the whole nation, which
proves case C.
2
Proposition 6 implies that when majorities in both regions prefer separation there will
be two separate countries and otherwise there will be just one country. This is exactly
the same outcome we got under the majority voting rule with two referenda and union
as status quo. Proposition 5 therefore also holds when we apply the voting rule with one
nationwide referendum. The outcomes are illustrated in Figures 3a-3d. The result on
the excessive incentives for separation and union holds under nationwide referendum also:
there still exist excessive incentives for separation.
4.3 Unequal union.
From the analysis in the basic model it follows that the smaller region (region A) wants
unication when  is small but the larger region (region B) does not want unication
when  is small. In this case for region B the gain of unication, a lower tax rate, does not
outweigh the loss by the change in the location of the public good. However, for region A
the per capita cost of the public good becomes too large for low values of . Therefore
it makes sense for region A to ask region B for unication under the condition that the
location of the public good will be determined solely by region B. We call this unequal or
unconditional union. In this case, region A gives up their political inuence in the hope of
tax reduction if region B accept unequal union.
There are several examples of this type of unequal union. The Dutch central bank,
for example, copied accurately its monetary policy from the German Bundesbank. It can
16
be that the costs of having an own monetary policy are too high for a relatively small
economy
11
.
We begin by noting that the larger region, Region B, will always accept unequal union:
the individuals in region B will then have higher utility since there is reduction in the tax
rates while there is no loss of political inuence. In cases where region B prefers equal
union over separation and region A is willing to accept an unequal union there arises a
bargaining problem. To keep matters simple, in such a case, we will assume that equal
union will take place. Under these conditions, we nd that the outomes are as follows:
Proposition 7 Region A prefers unequal union over separation if and only if  < 
uu
,
where 
uu
= 2F=(ga+ 2F ).
If a majority in region A prefers unequal union then the public good will be located at
(1 + )=2, i.e. in the centre of region B. Now, we state a Lemma helping us to determine
the outcome of majority voting.
Lemma 2 In region A there is a majority in favour of unequal union against the alterna-
tive of separation if the individual in the centre of region A is in favour of unequal union.
The proof of Lemma 2 can be found in the Appendix A, we present the proof of Proposi-
tion 7.
Proof: Clearly, everyone in region A prefers equal union over unequal union, therefore,
given Lemma 2, there will be a majority in region A for unequal union if the individual
=2 prefers unequal union, i.e., if
U
uu
(

2
) = g  
ga
2
+ y   F > g + y  
F

= U
I
(

2
) (16)
That is, if
 <
2F
ga+ 2F
= 
uu
(17)
This proves Proposition 7.
2
The parametric restrictions required for unequal union, equal union and separation are
given in Figure 4a-4e
12
.
11
Another example is Monaco, which has a full customs integration with France, while its defense is the
responsibility of France.
12
Note that  < 2F=(ga+ 2F ) implies F < ga=(2  2) and that ga=(2  2) > ga=4
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| Insert Figure 4a-4e here |
From the previous discussion and from the Figures it is clear that for certain parameter
values unequal union is preferred over separation by the smallest region. Unequal union
then softens the negative consequences of excessive separation under majority voting. As
one might expect, there will be unequal union when there is a large dierence in size
between the regions.
We note that the nature of eÆcient outcomes remains the same: The socially optimal
solution in the model extended with unequal union is the same as the socially optimal
solution in the basic model. The argument for this is that in a socially optimal solution it
is already possible in the basic model to locate the public good anywhere.
5 Conclusion
We have examined the incentives of regions to separate or to remain united. We sup-
pose that there is a xed costs associated with having an independent country. In each
country there are persons with dierent preferences about the nature of government and a
larger country contains greater diversity of opinions concerning government policy. These
assumptions generate a trade-o: in a smaller country the citizens have to pay higher
taxes to support their government but it is more likely that the government is closer to
the people. We have explored the impact of the size of dierent regions in shaping this
trade-o.
We nd that small regions have greater incentives for union, as compared to large
regions. However, on the whole, majority voting generates excessive incentives for separa-
tion. This motivates an examination of dierent institutions that are used in practice. One
arrangement we explore is the possibility of unequal union: this is an outcome in which
one region agrees to hand over all political inuence to the other region in return for the
benet of sharing the government and thus paying lower taxes. We nd that such unequal
union may be in the interests of dierent regions and also welfare enhancing.
6 Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma 1: The utility function of an individual i under unication is given by:
U
I
(i) = g(1  a j
1
2
  i j) + y   F (18)
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and under separation it is given by:
U
II
(i) = g(1  a j

2
  i j) + y  
F

(19)
Under unication the partial derivative of utility with respect to location is:
@U
I
(i)
@i
= ga; 8i 2 [0; ] (20)
Under separation this partial derivative is:
@U
II
(i)
@i
= ga; 8i 2 [0;

2
] (21)
Hence utility is linearly increasing at the same rate with respect to the location of an
individual i both in case of separation and unication. Therefore, when the individual at
location =2 prefers separation (unication) all the individuals in the interval [0; =2] are
in favour of separation (unication). The continuity of the utility function in i implies
that the individuals suÆciently close to the individual located at 1=2 prefer separation
(unication) when the individual located at 1=2 prefers separation (unication). Hence
there will be a majority in favour of separation (unication).
A similar argument holds for region B.
2
Proof of Proposition 3: In the socially optimal solution the sum of all individual utilities
is maximized. If it is optimal to have just one country, then it will be socially optimal to
choose the location of the public good and the tax level to maximize:
U
I
=
Z
1
0
U
I
(i)di = g(1  aE(d
i
jl)) + y   E(t
i
) (22)
and if it is optimal to form two governments then it will be socially optimal to choose the
location of the public good and the tax level to maximize:
U
II
=
Z
1
0
U
II
(i)di =
X
x=A;B
s
x
[g(1  aE
x
(d
i
jl
x
)) + y   E
x
(t
i
)] (23)
where E
x
(d
i
jl
x
), s
x
and E
x
(t
i
) are, respectively, the average distance in country x given
the location of the government, the size of country x and the lump sum tax level in
country x. Since the value of  is exogenously specied, the values of s
A
and s
B
are
 and 1   , respectively. In order to minimize E
x
(d
i
) it is socially optimal to locate
19
the government in the middle of each country. Hence, E
A
(d
i
), E
B
(d
i
) and E(d
i
) are,
respectively, =4, (1   )=4 and 1=4. Each country has to nance its own government,
therefore E
A
(t
i
), E
B
(t
i
) and E(t
i
) are, respectively, F=, F=(1   ) and F . Hence, the
social utility expressions (22) and (23) can be rewritten as follows:
U
I
= g(1 
a
4
) + y   F (24)
U
II
= [g(1  a

4
)] + (1  )[g(1  a
1  
4
)] + y   2F (25)
Comparing the total utilities under union and separation determines the choice for either
union or separation. It is better to have one government (one nation) if and only if U
I
> U
II
:
g(1 
a
4
) + y   F > [g(1  a

4
)] + (1  )[g(1  a
1  
4
)] + y   2F (26)
After rearranging terms, this inequality can be written as
ga
2

2
 
ga
2
 + F > 0 (27)
and this is equivalent with

2
   +
2F
ga
> 0 (28)
Note that this inequality will only have solutions if F < ga=8 = F
SP
.
Inequality (26) is satised for values of  when:
 <
1
2
 
s
1
4
 
2F
ga
(29)
or when
 >
1
2
+
s
1
4
 
2F
ga
(30)
Note that the right hand side of inequality (30) is greater than 1=2. Because  is, by
assumption, smaller than 1=2, we can omit inequality (30). This proves Proposition 3.
2
Proof of Lemma 2: Using the arguments of the proof of Lemma 1 we have to show that
the partial derivative of utility under unequal union with respect to the location of the
individuals is equal to the partial derivatives of utility under separation and unication on
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the [0; =2] interval. The utility function of an individual i with respect to his location i
under unequal union is:
U
uu
(i) = g(1  a j

2
+
1
2
  i j) + y   F (31)
Then the partial derivative of utility with respect to location is:
@U
uu
(i)
@i
= ga; 8i 2 [0;

2
] (32)
Hence utility is linearly decreasing by the same rate with respect to the preference distance
in case of separation, unication and unequal union. Therefore, when the individual at
location =2 prefers unequal union all the individuals in the interval [0; =2] are in favour
of unequal union. The continuity of the utility function in i implies that the individuals
suÆciently close to the individual located at 1=2 prefer unequal union when the individual
located at 1=2 prefers unequal union. Hence there will be a majority in favour of unequal
union.
A similar argument holds for region B.
2
7 Appendix B.
One of the assumptions in the basic model is that the initial endowment per individual is
equal in both regions. Wealth dierences in, for example, Belgium between Flanders and
Wallonia, between north and south Italy and between Norway and the European Union,
however, have an inuence on the incentives for union and separation in these regions. To
study wealth dierences across regions we write the initial endowment of the individuals in
region A and in region B as y
A
and y
B
, respectively. We suppose that these incomes dier
by a factor ,  > 0, and we write y
B
= y
A
. It can be veried that wealth dierences do
not matter when the public good is nanced by lump sum taxes. We therefore change the
system of taxation to proportional taxes. When both regions separate there are dierent
tax levels in each region and when there is union we have one tax level to nance the public
good. One justication for this assumption is that a dierence in tax-levels between the
regions is not sustainable when the subject of taxation (e.g. capital or labour) is mobile in
a union. If there exists a tax dierence between the regions in a union then the capital or
the labour will be located in the region with the lowest tax level. It is also possible that
the legislation of a union allows just one tax rate. This leads to three proportional tax
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levels: t
A
denotes the tax level under separation in region A, t
B
the same in region B and t
denotes the proportional tax level in a union. Recall that Proposition 1 tells us that there
exists an 
A
such that region A prefers union if and only if  2 (0; 
A
) and there exists an

B
such that region B prefers union if and only if  2 (
B
; 1=2).
Proposition 8 When  increases, 
A
and 
B
will increase. For  > 8F=(8F   ga) region
A always prefers union and for  < (8F   ga)=8F region B always prefers union.
This Proposition is in line with the idea that it is more attractive to unite with a rich
region than with a poor region: An increase in  implies that the individuals in region B
become relatively richer compared to the individuals in region A. Union becomes therefore
more attractive for region A and less attractive for the individuals in region B, which is
reected by the increases in 
A
and 
B
, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 8: Note that we can use Lemma 1 in this proof. We will prove
that an increase in  leads to an increase in 
A
. The proof that an increase in  leads to
an increase in 
B
has the same structure as in the 
A
-case and it is therefore not given.
Recall that we restricted  to values between 0 and 1=2. The utility of individual =2
under union is
U
I
(

2
) = g  
ga
2
+
ga
2
+ y
A
 
F
( + (1  ))y
A
y
A
(33)
and under separation
U
II
(

2
) = g + y
A
 
F

(34)
Let U

I
() and U

II
() be the utility of individual =2 under union and separation, respec-
tively. Like in the standard model, dene 
A
() as
U

I
() < U

II
() for  < 
A
()
U

I
() = U

II
() for  = 
A
()
U

I
() > U

II
() for  > 
A
()
(35)
Hence, since U

I
() and U

II
() are dierentiable in  for  2 (0; 1=2)
@[U

I
(
A
())  U

II
(
A
())]
@
< 0 (36)
Next note that at 
A
(), U

I
(())  U

II
(()) = 0. Hence,
@[U
I
(
A
())  U
II
(
A
())]
@
d +
@[U
I
(
A
())  U
II
(
A
())]
@
d = 0 (37)
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This implies that
d
A
()
d
=
 
@[U

I
(
A
()) U

II
(
A
())]
@
@[U

I
(
A
()) U

II
(
A
())]
@
(38)
Note that @U

II
(
A
())=@ = 0,
@U

I
()
@
=
F (1  )
( + (1  ))
2
> 0 (39)
and recall that
@[U

I
(
A
())  U

II
(
A
())]
@
< 0 (40)
Hence d
A
()=d > 0. This completes the proof.
2
Proposition 9 The socially desirable outcome does not change when the endowments
across regions vary.
Proof: In a social optimum the sum of all individual utilities is maximized. The utility
under union is
U
I
=
Z
1
0
U
I
(i)di =
X
x=A;B
s
x
[g(1  aE(d
i
jl)) + y
x
  t
x
y
x
] (41)
This implies that
U
I
= g(1  aE(d
i
jl)) + y  
X
x=A;B
s
x
t
x
y
x
= g(1 
a
4
) + y   F (42)
The utility under separation is
U
II
=
Z
1
0
U
II
(i)di =
X
x=A;B
s
x
[g(1  aE(d
i
jl)) + y
x
  t
x
y
x
] (43)
So total utility under separation can be written as
U
II
= [g(1  a

4
)] + (1  )[g(1  a
1  
4
)]  2F (44)
These utilities are equal to the utilities of equations 24 and 25. We can therefore apply
the same analysis as in the standard model.
2
This Proposition implies that dierences in initial endowments across regions are irrelevant
for the socially optimal outcome in which aggregate utility is maximized. Moreover, the
possibility of choosing dierent taxation systems for compensation or for wealth transfers
does not inuence the the socially desirable outcome.
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